opening
The therapeutic/enhancement distinction is philosophically unstable. Editing to eliminate Huntington's disease is therapeutic. Editing to reduce risk of late-onset Alzheimer's — is that therapeutic? What about reducing the genetic component of depression? Editing for height in a child who would have been in the bottom fifth percentile? The categories bleed. A regulatory framework that permits therapeutic editing but prohibits enhancement needs a principled distinction it can actually enforce, which no one has provided.
Rebuttal
The consent argument proves too much. Parents routinely make irreversible decisions that shape who their children will be — early education, diet, the country in which they're raised, their language, their religious exposure. We don't treat these as autonomy violations requiring consent. The distinction people draw between genetic and environmental shaping is either a naturalistic fallacy (genetic = special because natural) or requires an argument about what makes gene editing categorically different from these other parental decisions.